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valiant attempt to sue his employer twice 
for the same occupational injury, thus, 
defeating the principle behind the 
system of workers' compensation of 
limiting an emplo]ers' liability. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of both the Court of Special 
Appeals and the trial court and 
adamantly refused to apportion the 
claimant's injury between the two Acts. 
In fact, in the area of workers' 
compensation, the courts are generally 
quite reluctant to apportion in such a 
manner. See Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Drydock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327 
(4th Cir. 1982) (single employer liable 
for the claimant's hearing loss although 
it was fully documented that the 
claimant worked for numerous 
employers). Apportionment between 
state and federal systems is also not 
permitted. See McCabe v. Sun 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock, Inc., 
Ben.Rev.Bd.Serv. (MB) 509 (1975), 
rev'd. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 234 (3d 
Cir. 1979). In Stanley, the court 
determined that since the LHWCA 
applied to a portion of the claimant's 
injury, then the Act would provide 
coverage for the entire injury. 
The only case cited by Stanley as 
providing authority for his position is 
Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 
14 Ben.Rev.Bd.serv. (MB) 220.15, 
BRB No. 76-244 (Aug. 13, 1981). At 
issue in that case was whether the 
claimant was a covered employee under 
the Act during his long history of 
employment, and the Benefits Review 
Board ("Board") stated, "[W]e have 
concluded that in determining 
jurisdiction we must apply pre-
amendment law to the period of 
exposure prior to 1972 when the Act 
became effective, and post-amendment 
law thereafter;" 14 Ben.Rev.Bd. Servo 
(MB) at 223. This statement, however, 
was limited to the issue of determining 
jurisdiction and was not applied by the 
Board to determine the issue of 
apportionment. Under this line of 
reasoning, the Board found that 
Verderane was covered under the pre-
amendment Act, although not covered 
after 1972. This fact, however, did not 
deter the Board from holding that the 
entire claim was compensable under the 
LHWCA. "However, our conclusion 
that claimant may have been exposed to 
additional excessive noise during the 
period when his employment was 
outside the coverage of the Act does not 
affect our determination that his vertigo 
is compensable based on the earlier 
exposure." Id. at 225. 
The Stanley decision is in accord with 
the public policy considerations which 
are an essential part of the workers' 
compensation system. To allow this 
type of apportionment would clearly 
defeat the Congressional intent of 
limiting an employer's liability for a 
maritime worker's occupational injury. 
Such apportionment between acts 
would be in obvious conflict with the 
LHWCA, 33 U.S.c. §905 (a) which 
provides that "[ t ]he liability of an 
employer prescribed in section 904 of 
this title shall be exclusive and in place of 
all other liablility of such employer to 
the employee... ." Stanley, therefore, 
manifests the intent of Congress 
regarding the exclusiveness of liability 
under the LHWCA and, presumably, 
any possible apportionment between 
Acts is an issue for the Congress and not 
the courts to ultimately determine. m 
- by Cathleen A. Quigg 
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IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE 
I
nState V. Faulkner, 301 Md. 
482,483 A.2d 759 (1984), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recognized that imperfect self defense 
can be used by a defendant as a defense 
to mitigate a conviction entered against 
him. To prevail upon such a defense, the 
defendant must show the jury that his 
actions were based on a subjectively 
honest but objectively unreasonable 
belief that he had to resort to deadly 
force to prevent his own serious bodily 
injury or death. 
Faulkner had been involved in an 
argument outside of a Baltimore City 
bar. This argument escalated into a fist 
fight and then into a non-fatal shooting. 
Subsequently, Faulkner was charged 
with assault with intent to murder and 
related offenses. At his trial in the 
Criminal Court of Baltimore, the court 
instructed the jury as to the defenses of 
justification. Faulkner's request for a 
jury instruction on imperfect self 
defense was refused by the judge. The 
jury subsequently found Faulkner guilty 
of assault with intent to murder. On 
appeal, the court of special appeals, in a 
split decision, agreed with Faulkner, and 
held that he was entitled to the 
instruction of imperfect self defense 
because he had produced enough 
evidence to generate a jury issue 
regarding his belief at the time of the 
shooting. The court of appeals agreed, 
and went on to hold that the defense of 
imperfect self defense applies to the 
offense of assault with intent to murder. 
The mitigating defense of imperfect 
self defense operates to negate malice, 
which is the mental state that the state 
must prove to establish the crime of 
murder. The court began its opinion by 
noting that the difference between 
murder and manslaughter is the absence 
of malice. Self defense operates as a 
complete defense to either murder or 
manslaughter. A proper claim of self 
defense will justify the homicide and 
result in a judgment of acquittal. On the 
other hand, imperfect self defense is not 
a complete defense to a crime, but 
rather, is merely a mitigating defense 
which operates to negate malice, thereby 
reducing murder to manslaughter. 
Similar to imperfect self defense are 
the heat of passion defenses of mutual 
combat, assault and battery and 
discovering a spouse in the act of sexual 
intercourse with another, which can also 
be used by a defendant to mitigate a 
conviction entered against him. The key 
Spring, 1985 /The Law Fmum-9 
distinction between imperfect self 
defense and the heat of passion defenses 
is that the defendant acted the way he 
did due to a "fear of life" rather than a 
heat of passion. The judicial recognition 
of the imperfect self defense allows the 
courts to avoid the choice between 
murder and complete exonerations in 
non-heat of passion cases where the 
defendant's conduct warranted neither a 
murder conviction nor an acquittal. 
This defense requires the defendant to 
bear some responsibility for the 
homicide, even though he may have 
lacked the requisite mens rea for 
murder. 
The court reviewed the history of the 
imperfect self defense doctrine and 
found that the case law revealed three 
variations of the doctrine. Some courts 
have applied the doctrine where the 
homicide at issue falls within the perfect 
self defense doctrine, except for the fault 
of the defendant in provoking or 
initiating the difficulty at the non-deadly 
force level. Other courts have applied 
the doctrine where the defendant 
committed a homicide because of an 
honest but unreasonable belief that he 
was about to suffer death or serious 
bodily harm. Still, other courts have 
recognized the doctrine when the 
defendant uses unreasonable force in 
defending himself and as a result, killed 
his opponent. 
Prior to the Faulkner decision, the 
court of special appeals had dealt with 
six imperfect defense cases which 
gradually expanded the application of 
this mitigating defense to the criminal 
defenses of imperfect defense of others, 
Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349 
A2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 
733 (1976) imperfect defense of duress, 
Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110, 
349 A.2d 421 (1975), cert. denied, 278 
Md. 735 (1976), and imperfect defense 
of habitation, Law v. State, 29 Md. App. 
457,349 A2d 295 (1975), cert. denied, 
278 Md. 729 (1976). 
Due to the Faulkner decision, the 
defendant is now presented with a wide 
range of mitigating defenses that serve to 
reduce a conviction of murder to 
manslaughter. As the Court stated, "A 
defendant who commits a homicide 
while honestly, though unreasonably, 
believing that he is threatened with 
death or serious bodily harm, does not 
act with malice. Absent malice, he 
cannot be convicted of murder. 
Nevertheless, because the killing was 
committed without justification or 
excuse, the defendant is not entitled to 
full exoreration. " Yet, according to the 
court the defendant is entitled to a 
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proper instruction to show the 
defendant's subjective (honest) belief 
that the use of force was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or serious 
bodily harm. Once the defendant has 
established the existence of that belief, 
the jury must reject the reasonableness 
of that belief as well as the existence of 
that belief itself to find the defendant 
guilty of murder. m 
by Regan J .R. Smith 
DWI Rights 
Chemical Sobriety Test 
by Jennifer Hammond 
T
he Maryland Court of Appeals 
recently considered the issue of 
whether a person who is appre-
hended for driving while intoxicated has 
a constitutional right to consult counsel 
before deciding whether to submit to a 
chemical sobriety test. In Sites v. State, 
300 Md. 701,481 A2d 192 (1984), the 
court of appeals held that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, as well as Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
requires that a person under detention 
as a drunk driving suspect must, if the 
suspect so requests, be permitted a 
reasonable opportunity to communicate 
with counsel before submitting to a 
chemical sobriety test, as long as the 
attempted communication will not 
substantially interfere with the timely 
administration of the testing process. 
The laws concerning submission to a 
sobriety test in Maryland are fairly clear-
cut. For instance, a chemical sobriety 
test must be administered within two 
hours "after the person accused is 
apprehended." Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 10-303 (1984). A person 
may not be compelled to submit to such 
a test and any refusal is not admissible at 
a trial since no inference or presumption 
concerning guilt arises as a result of 
refusal to submit to the test. Md. Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-309 (1984). 
Additionally, § 16-205.l(a) of the 
Transportation Article - the "implied 
consent" statute - explicitly states that 
any person who operates a motor 
vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have 
consented to take a chemical test to 
determine alcohol content if that person 
is apprehended on suspicion of drunk 
driving. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16-
205.l(b) (1984). 
Maryland driver who declines to take 
the chemical sobriety test "shall" have 
his license suspended for not less than 
60 days or more than 6 months for a first 
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16-
205.l(b) (1984). 
As previously stated, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals in Sites based its 
decision on the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The court, 
citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952), stated that, while the exact 
contours of the due process clause are 
not definable with precision, the 
constitutional right of due process 
